Sunday, July 15, 2012

Finding Work–Life Balance, Increasing Job Satisfaction

I’ve talked to several attorneys about the issue of work–life balance. Some advice has been insightful, some cliché, and some downright surprising. One of my mentors explained that you cannot be multidimensional. You must be the same person at work as you are in every other aspect of your life. He then shared a remark by Bruce Hafen: “I think in the end, the most valuable contributions will be made by those who are well balanced.” My mentor’s main conclusion was that the attorney who is the same person both at home and at work will be much more effective than the attorney who is not.

In a small-group setting, a leading figure was asked this same question about how to find the right balance. The reply was deft: “You just muddle through.” He went on to explain that sometimes you’ll dedicate too much time to work, and other times you’ll dedicate too much time to home. You make adjustments as you need and keep going. There’s no real secret formula to success.

Attorneys use many tools to cope with stress or increase their job satisfaction. One attorney told me how important it is to build strong relationships with others in the workplace; it helps you cope with a stressful situation when you are working with other people you know and care about. Another attorney told me that making sure to have small conversations with people—asking how their day is going, asking about their interests, etc.—as you come into contact with them each day makes them and you feel better and makes for a much more pleasant work environment.

Yet another attorney told me something I’ll never forget: when given the choice between two assignments, choose the one that interests you. All other things being equal, if there is one project that is more interesting to you than another, you will do a much better job on it and will submit a much better work product. The attorney offered me this candid advice by sharing a story about Dallin H. Oaks deciding what to write about one summer for a law-review article. Oaks had narrowed down his choices to two areas of law when he went to one of his mentors for advice on what to do. Oak’s mentor asked him which area of law Oaks was more interested in; he then advised Oaks to write about that area. That law-review article is now viewed as foundational in that area of law and it’s because Oaks had an interest in what he was researching and writing about.



Monday, July 2, 2012

Fallacy of Equivocation


While there is wide disagreement among philosophers and logicians about a precise definition for the term fallacy,[1] it is generally agreed that fallacies are mistakes in reasoning that involve ambiguity and vagueness.[2] A fallacy can be a type of error in an argument, a type of error in reasoning (such as arguing, defining, and explaining), a false belief, or a rhetorical technique that causes any of these errors.[3] For present purposes, fallacy refers either to errors in the substance of arguments (as opposed to errors in the arguer’s thinking) or to the rhetorical tools that cause these errors. 

Fallacies are also described as being either formal or informal. Formal fallacies are concerned with highly technical errors in the logical structure of the argument.[4] Legal arguments rarely[5] contain formal fallacies.[6]

Informal fallacies are concerned not with the form but with the content (and possibly the intent) of the reasoning.[7] They are “proofs that appear at first glance to be sound but are fatally flawed in their reasoning or construction.”[8] And from a psychology perspective, “a fallacy is often defined as a mistake in reasoning used for deceptive purposes.”[9] While this certainly is not categorically true of all informal fallacies, “many of the informal fallacies are often used in the manipulation of opinion.”[10] Informal fallacies can also be difficult to identify. For instance, a slippery-slope argument often straddles the line between being persuasively plausible and fallaciously exaggerated.[11] For present purposes, a fallacious argument is either inductively very weak, or contains an unjustified premise, or ignores relevant, available evidence that the arguer should know about, and the argument can be used to persuade.[12] **

One such informal fallacy is the fallacy of equivocation: “the illegitimate switching of the meaning of a term during the reasoning.”[13] Below is an example of the fallacy of equivocation. Watch how the author uses the words majority and median:

Salary data show that the vast majority of lawyers earn rela­tively high salaries. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, lawyers boast the fourth highest median salary behind med­ical doctors, dentists and CEOs (some of whom have law de­grees). While the majority of occupations have median sala­ries between $20,000 and $49,999, the median for lawyers in 2010 was almost $113,000. Again, this was the median — the actual midpoint — which means the majority of lawyers made six-figures.


The problem here is that majority and median are equivocal words, or words that are subject to two or more interpretations and are usually used to mislead or confuse. The author equivocates because he uses the same words twice but changes the meaning of the words. Here is a breakdown showing the connotation of each phrase that uses majority or median.

Equivocal Words
§  vast majority of lawyers = most lawyers
§  majority of occupations = most occupations
§  median salaries = average salaries
§  median [salary] for lawyers = average salary
§  median = the actual midpoint salary with equal numbers of salaries that are higher and lower
§  majority of lawyers = a literal majority, or a number equaling more than half of the total (at least 50.1%)

The main, implicit conclusion that the author likely hoped his reader would draw might be something along these lines:

The vast majority of lawyers made at least $113,000 in 2010.

But this conclusion just doesn't follow from the premises. The more genuine argument leads to a different conclusion: a literal majority of lawyers earned a relatively high salary in 2010.

1.      Relatively high salary means more than $99,999.99
2.      Lawyers have the fourth-highest median salary
3.      Most occupations had a median salary between $20k and $50k in 2010
4.      Lawyers had a median salary of $113k in 2010
5.      Median is the midpoint on a range of salaries
6.      Only 50% of lawyers earned at least $113k in 2010
7.      But some lawyers also earned between $100k and $113k in 2010
8.      At least 50.1% of lawyers earned more than $99,999.99 in 2010; thus,

A literal majority of lawyers earned a relatively high salary in 2010.

Sketching out the argument in this way reveals its real weakness. Regardless of whether the argument actually commits the fallacy of equivocation, we should still reject its persuasiveness because the premises lead to an equally troubling conclusion:

1.      It is also true that 50% of lawyers earned less than $113k in 2010;
2.      And a proportionately large minority of lawyers earned less than $99,999.99; thus,

A large minority of lawyers did not earn a relatively high salary in 2010.



          **   These first three paragraphs come from a paper I published during my third-year of law school. Cory S. Clements, Comment, Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation: Using Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases to Win the War of Words, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 319, 331–33 & nn.61–72, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236669.
          [1].   The Internet is rich with information about the various types of logical fallacies. See Bradley Dowden, Fallacies, Internet Encyc. Phil., http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy (last updated Dec. 31, 2010) (content may also be accessed through an alternate domain, dewsberry.com, http://dewsberry.com/content/es/content/reference/fallacies/fallacies.htm); Charles Ess, Informal Fallacies, Drury.edu, http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Overview.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013); Logical Fallacies, http://www.logicalfallacies.info (last visited Feb. 3, 2013); Taxonomy of the Logical Fallacies, Fallacy Files, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/taxonomy.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
          [2].   Dowden, supra note 1 (“The term ‘fallacy’ is not a precise term. One reason is that it is ambiguous.”).
          [3].   Id.
          [4].   Id. Formal fallacies are typically studied as part of a course on categorical, statement, and predicate logic. See generally Frances Howard-Snyder, Daniel Howard-Snyder & Ryan Wasserman, The Power of Logic (5th ed. 2012).
          [5].   Though rare, legal arguments containing formal fallacies do appear from time to time—even in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Cory S. Clements, Note, Judicial Takings in Vandevere v. Lloyd, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 423, 438–39 & n.117, available at http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1341676891_04clements.fin.pdf (construing Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2011)).
[T]he Ninth Circuit’s reasoning . . . is a non-sequitur. Logically speaking, the argument is invalid because it denies the antecedent, taking the following form: If (A), then (B). (Not-A). So, (not-B). To make sense of how the court’s reasoning is faulty, one must supply the implicit premises, (A) and (B), because the court’s argument made explicit only the contrapositives, (Not-A) and (Not-B). Thus, the argument with its implicit premises reads as follows:
If (A) Lucas’s remand order concerned the extent of the property interest, then (B) the extent of the property interest is not a matter of state law. (Not-A) Lucas’s remand order “did not concern the extent of the property interest.” So, (not-B) “the extent of the property interest” “is a matter of state law.”
Id. (footnote omitted) (“[T]he Court’s quarrel with the state supreme court did not concern the extent of the property interest in the beachfront land, which the Court’s remand order firmly suggests is a matter of state law but, rather, concerned the extent to which the state could invade a property interest without providing just compensation, which is a matter of federal law.” (quoting Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964)).
For an in-depth explanation of how to recognize legal arguments that commit the fallacy of denying the antecedent, see Stephen M. Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent as a Litigation Tool, 79 Miss. L.J. 669, 683 (2010) (“[W]here the rules of logic are not observed, the argument takes the form of a fallacy. The Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent is one fallacy that results from failure to observe the logical rules. Where the argument denies the antecedent term of the hypothetical syllogism, it violates the rule that requires the antecedent term be affirmed. Accordingly, when the antecedent term is denied, the argument commits the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent and is logically invalid.”).
          [6].   This is because formal fallacies are easier to spot than informal fallacies. E.g., Stephen M. Rice, Indiscernible Logic: Using the Logical Fallacies of the Illicit Major Term and the Illicit Minor Term as Litigation Tools, 47 Willamette L. Rev. 101, 107 (2010) (“These illogical arguments, called fallacies, can be identified by the pattern of an argument’s form, which makes them easy to identify, describe, and discredit.”). Judge Aldisert defines formal fallacy as follows:
A formal fallacy is any violation of any of the six rules of the categorical syllogism or the rules of the hypothetical or disjunctive -alternative syllogism. It is an argument whose conclusion could be false even if all its premises are true. It can be detected merely by examining the form (hence its name) or structure of the argument.
Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 141 (1976).          
          [7].   William F. Lawhead, The Philosophical Journey app. A-9 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that informal fallacies are “a type of bad reasoning that can only be detected by examining the content of the argument”).
          [8].   Roberto Aron et al., Trial Communication Skills § 1.12 (2d ed. 2011).
          [9].   Introduction to Logic: Informal Fallacies, P.L.E., http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/fall acy_topics.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
        [10].   Id.
        [11].   E.g., Mitchell F. Park, Comment, Defining One’s Own Concept of Existence and the Meaning of the Universe: The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 837, 881 n.191 (“Suppose someone claims that a first step (in a chain of causes and effects, or a chain of reasoning) will probably lead to a second step that in turn will probably lead to another step and so on until a final step ends in trouble. If the likelihood of the trouble occurring is exaggerated, the slippery slope fallacy is committed.” (quoting Dowden, supra note 1)).
        [12].   Dowden, supra note 1.
        [13].   Id.

Sunday, June 24, 2012

Epistemology 101: Perfection and Imperfection

Within philosophy, epistemology is “the study of knowledge and justified belief.” Epistemology asks questions about the sources of knowledge, the limits of knowledge, and the justifications of knowledge. See Matthias Steup, Epistemology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Fall 2012 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/ epistemology/. Below I argue that Rationalism, rather than Empiricism, provides the best explanation for how we gain knowledge. For background reading on these two competing views, see Peter Markie, Rationalism vs. Empiricism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/.

Humans acquire knowledge and discover all truths only through rational investigation. It is widely accepted that if knowledge is possible, it must be based in true, justified belief. Rationalism suggests that the superior path to knowledge is traversed through reason alone, that the senses are not reliable, and that fundamental truths are inborn within each person. Among these inborn ideas is the concept of perfection. Differing schools of thought, which disagree with the rationalist position, have made it necessary to further defend Rationalism and to refute their false claims. Their arguments attempt to prove that the concept of perfection is learned through experiencing imperfection. These arguments are weak, however, and fail to stand up to Rationalism.

Perfection is an abstract idea that cannot be perceived with the senses. In other words, we cannot taste, touch, feel, see, or hear perfection itself. Concepts such as flawlessness, or a degree of excellence that cannot be exceeded, are just the beginning of our understanding of perfection itself. Men can't even being to fathom how to empirically measure and understand the form of perfection. But there exists within us the opposite characteristic: imperfection. Critics of Rationalism might construct an argument as follows:

If we are alive, then we can be imperfection. If we are capable of imperfection, then we are capable of understanding imperfection through observation. If we are capable of understanding imperfection through observation, then we can understand its opposite—perfection (~imperfection)—through induction. We are alive. Therefore, we can understand perfection through induction.

This argument has a valid form and seems to lead to a true conclusion. Upon closer inspection, however, the argument's flaws are readily apparent. What is the strict meaning of the term imperfection, and how will one recognize it through observation? If imperfection is defined as anything that falls short of perfection, then what is the strict definition of perfection to compare against and demonstrate that the thing is indeed imperfection? If critics of Rationalism use an argument like the one above, then they themselves are capable of imperfection. And if they are capable of imperfection, then their argument is capable of imperfection. Therefore, if opponents of Rationalism use such an argument to prove that perfection can be known through sense‑experience induction, then their arguments are also capable of imperfection.

This Empiricist argument (“If we are alive, then we are capable of imperfection.”) is weak and leads to several inconsistencies and inadequacies. First, the argument includes a self-referential inconsistency: it claims that if we are living not only are we capable of imperfection but also we are capable of knowing perfection. But if we are truly imperfect, we are fallible and can not be trusted to conclude the truth about perfection. Second, the argument is unclear about the origin of the concepts of imperfection and perfection. By studying ourselves, we recognize that we lack excellence in various areas of our lives—we have flaws. The only way to recognize self-imperfection is to have a true, justified belief, backed by empirically tested data, of what perfection is since it is the opposite of imperfection. Yet the only way to arrive at the idea of perfection is to have the same type of knowledge regarding imperfection. Empirically finding these answers presents a major paradox.

Since perfection does not exist within our nature, we must rely on reason to uncover the truths already embedded within our minds. The form of perfection will always exist, regardless of whether we are ever perfect ourselves. The origin of all principles and ideas, then, must exist outside of our sensory experience. For present purposes, the form of imperfect and the form of perfect are the main focus. We can discover the concepts of perfection and imperfection either through empirical observation, experience, and induction or through rational inquiry. As demonstrated above, however, we cannot discover perfection and imperfection through experience, empirical observation, or induction. Therefore, we can discover perfection and imperfection—two innate ideas that have always existed—only through reason.

Understanding the form of perfect requires a priori knowledge, or knowledge that does not depend on sensory experience, because we cannot accurately classify anything in our our world as perfect. Observed actions about the nature of an intangible concept such as imperfection cannot lead to a justified, true belief about the nature and idea of its opposite. Therefore, perfection exists innately in the mind as an ideal and not as something experienced through a series of events. And because perfection is a concept of the mind, we must discover perfection by gaining knowledge. Because we cannot use experience, empirical observation, or induction to discover the concept of perfection, Empiricism cannot fully account for how we discover knowledge. It thus follows that humans acquire knowledge and discover all truths through rational investigation.

Monday, June 11, 2012

Purely Legal Questions in a Political District

Though Washington, D.C., is a very political place, I find it refreshing to reflect on the legal arguments underlying some of the major cases to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court over the next three weeks. But in doing so, I am not explicitly endorsing a particular political position. Retired Associate Justice John Paul Stevens has argued that Obamacare is likely constitutional and should be upheld under the Supreme Court's precedent case Gonzales v. Raich. While Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Raich, he is still quite a crafty nonagenarian. 
Questions often arise, in one form or another, like the following:

“How can Congress use the commerce clause to compel commerce? If Congress can compel me to purchase insurance to help cover the government's cost of my healthcare, can it likewise compel me to walk 30 minutes a day to reduce it? If not, what's the distinction?”

“What is the difference between paying a tax penalty for refusing to buy health insurance (because those fees will be used to lower the Government's costs to cover your healthcare needs) and having to walk 30 minutes a day (because it will make you healthier and act as a ‘preventative care,’ thus lowering the government’s costs to cover you because you will have fewer potential healthcare needs)?”

“Why can the federal government compel me under the law to purchase a commercial product, or fine me for noncompliance? If the answer is that the government has a compelling interest in keeping its costs under Obamacare down, then my next question is could the federal government compel mandatory calisthenics to satisfy the same government interest?”

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below I provide both a fewer-than-fifty-word response and a longer response.

Fewer-than-fifty-word Response: read points numbered 1. and 2. below.
Longer Response: read the entire note.

1. The government can't compel you to purchase a commercial product or pay a fine in this instance because you already pay for health insurance (I assume).

(If you do not pay for health insurance, please proceed to number 2.)


2. The government already does compel you to purchase a commercial product: "retirement insurance," or Social Security.

(If you do not pay for Social Security, please proceed to number 3.)


3. Analytically, there probably is no distinction between the “individual mandate” and the “individual calisthenics.” If Congress can do the former, it should be able to do the latter (assuming, arguendo, that the goals of both regulations are to lower the total cost of healthcare and that a rational relationship exists between calisthenics and lower healthcare costs). But practically, the difference is that, if given the choice between the two, most Americans would rather pay for a year’s supply of get-out-of-gym-class notes than have to go to gym class 365 days a year.

(If this practical difference is not convincing, please proceed to number 4.)


4. We don't need to seriously pursue the question of a calisthenics mandate because the individual mandate does not present a constitutional question that requires strict (or even intermediate) scrutiny. Seeing as how the Lochner era is far behind us, the right to contract freely is no longer a heavily protected right. Congress doesn't need a compelling interest behind its economic regulations, just a legitimate interest. Congress's chosen regulation of having every citizen maintain a minimum level of health coverage (or pay a tax) need only be rationally related to achieving its legitimate interest in lowering the cost of healthcare for all citizens. We have high healthcare costs in large part because of the high number of people who choose to "self-insure" for the cost of healthcare services rather than buy health insurance. (See quoted passages below for actual numbers). Because the chosen regulation eliminates the self-insurers, the regulation should decrease the cost of healthcare. Because the regulation should decrease the cost of healthcare, the regulation is rationally related to achieving the legitimate interest in lowering overall healthcare costs.

(If you think Congress is attempting to “compel commerce/economic activity,” please proceed to number 5.)


5. Self-insuring for the cost of healthcare services is an economic activity.
The minimum coverage provision regulates activity that is decidedly economic. In Raich, the Supreme Court explained that “‘[e]conomics’refers to ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’” Consumption of health care falls squarely within Raich 's definition of economics, and virtually every individual in this country consumes these services. Individuals must finance the cost of health care by purchasing an insurance policy or by self-insuring, cognizant of the backstop of free services required by law. By requiring individuals to maintain a certain level of coverage, the minimum coverage provision regulates the financing of health care services, and specifically the practice of self-insuring for the cost of care. The activity of foregoing health insurance and attempting to cover the cost of health care needs by self-insuring is no less economic than the activity of purchasing an insurance plan. Thus, the financing of health care services, and specifically the practice of self-insuring, is economic activity.
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).


6. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) was enacted "to ensure that individuals, regardless of their ability to pay, receive adequate emergency medical care." Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, federal laws (not to mention sound principles of ethics and human decency) require healthcare providers to treat people who have no ability to pay for their services. Those unpaid costs end up increasing the cost of healthcare for everyone who is insured.

Congress had a rational basis to believe that the practice of self-insuring for the cost of health care, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. An estimated 18.8% of the non-elderly United States population (about 50 million people) had no form of health insurance for 2009. Virtually everyone requires health care services at some point, and unlike nearly all other industries, the health care market is governed by federal and state laws requiring institutions to provide services regardless of a patient's ability to pay. The uninsured cannot avoid the need for health care, and they consume over $100 billion in health care services annually. The high cost of health care means that those who self-insure, as a class, are unable to pay for the health care services that they receive. Congress found that the aggregate cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured in 2008 was $43 billion. Congress also determined that the cost of uncompensated care is passed on from providers “to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families.” This cost-shifting inflates the premiums that families must pay for their health insurance “by on average over $1,000 a year.” Rising premiums push even more individuals out of the health insurance market, further increasing the cost of health insurance and perpetuating the cycle. Thus, the practice of self-insuring substantially affects interstate commerce by driving up the cost of health care as well as by shifting costs to third parties.
Self-insuring for the cost of health care directly affects the interstate market for health care delivery and health insurance. These effects are not at all attenuated as were the links between the regulated activities and interstate commerce in Lopez and Morrison. Similar to the causal relationship in Wickard, self-insuring individuals are attempting to fulfill their own demand for a commodity rather than resort to the market and are thereby thwarting Congress's efforts to stabilize prices. Therefore, the minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of the Commerce Power because Congress had a rational basis for concluding that, in the aggregate, the practice of self-insuring for the cost of health care substantially affects interstate commerce.
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).


7. Generally, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is a good thing for people who already maintain health insurance (and for those who cannot afford health insurance). Why are we concerned about the cost of health insurance decreasing? I suppose the other rational way to decrease health insurance costs is to deny healthcare services to every self-insurer who cannot afford to pay for emergency treatment. We could kill off two laws, EMTALA and PPACA, and it would solve the problem.
Calisthenics, while very tempting, does not seem tailored to achieve the desired goal. 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What other possibilities are there that could serve the desired goal of reducing healthcare costs and expanding coverage across the board? Leave a comment below.

Sunday, June 3, 2012

Writing in Plain Language

It’s great to be in the nation’s capitol and to read that Congress thinks plain language is important. On October 11, 2011, the Plain Writing Act of 2010 became fully in force. Congress passed the Act to require agencies to draft all new forms, publications, and publicly distributed documents in easy-to-understand, everyday English. The Act defines plain writing as “writing that is clear, concise, well-organized, and follows other best practices appropriate to the subject or field and intended audience. Also noteworthy, on January 18, 2012, Congressman Bruce Braley introduced the Plain Regulations Act of 2012, which would require agencies to draft all new and substantially revised regulations in plain English.

This link provides the name of each federal agency’s designated plain-language expert and a URL to the agency’s plan describing how it intends to start using plain language. Since tomorrow I start work at the Federal Communications Commission, here I borrow from the FCC’s Plain Language Workbook: Five Steps to Clear, Effective Communications for the Federal Communications Commission.

Following are the FCC’s five plain-language attributes:
1.     Concise word use
2.     The active voice
3.     Cohesion
4.     Reader-focus
5.     Tone
Each attribute has more specific guidance, which I briefly summarize below. But before jumping in to these attributes, consider just two simple principles to vastly improve your writing or speaking today.


Two Words or Phrases You Should Never Use in Writing or Speaking
(1)            and/or 
This term causes more problems than it solves (because it solves none). While and/or commonly means “the one or the other or both,” half the time and/or actually means and, and half the time and/or actually means or. See Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 57–58 (3d ed. 2011); Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing in Plain English 112–13 (2001).

(2)            prior to and subsequent to
These two-word substitutes for the words before and after just won't seem to go away. The phrase prior to conveys nothing more precise than the word before, and the phrase subsequent to conveys nothing more precise than the word after.


And here are the FCC’s five plain-language attributes in a bit more detail:
I.            Concise Word Use
  • Avoid general-specific combinations
  • Avoid negative structures
  • Avoid little extra words
  • Avoid repeated words
  • Avoid twin words
  • Avoid obvious information
II.            The Active Voice
  • Three reasons to avoid passive voice:
1.    the actor and the action get separated
2.    the actor gets eliminated
3.    the actor becomes a hidden verb*
*hidden verbs are also called nominalizations — provide testimony is a nominalization of testify.
III.            Cohesion
  • Subject lines, headers, and titles should help the reader to find information quickly.
IV.            Reader-Focus
  • Write with the reader’s point of view in mind.
  • Consider the information’s position within the piece and whether it helps the piece as a whole to flow logically.
  • Use the second-person “you.”
  • Write so you are showing (not telling) your message to the reader.
  • Use jargon-free language.
V.            Tone
  • Following are three tones to be aware of:
1.    Hyper-formal tone should never be used in FCC writing.
2.    Formal tone is used in most FCC documents.
3.    Informal tone is good for emails, group discussion, and blog posts.
  • These six elements of style also improve tone:
1.    Don’t abbreviate words unless they are common everywhere.
2.    Don’t overuse acronyms and initialisms; spell out the whole word several times in a single document.
3.    Don’t use an ampersand (&) in place of the word and unless an ampersand is part of an entity’s name.
4.    Use contractions in all FCC writing except congressional documents or highly formal pieces.
5.    Use genderless language.
6.    Use Ms. for all women unless they have a title.